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In an effort to develop strong cyber resilience, international organizations, academic institutions, 
corporations and countries have been actively working to develop cybersecurity frameworks (CSFs). 
Such efforts emphasize various perspectives depending on the organization’s intention, while their 
contents involve the same concept. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the many varied 
perspectives on CSFs and gather them into a concise view by contrasting different intentions and 
distilling shared concepts. To do so, this study uses the document analysis method alongside two 
cycles of coding (descriptive coding and pattern coding) to excerpt 12 extant CSFs. The various 
intentions can be cascaded with respect to four areas: 1) the promoted action, 2) the driver, 3) the 
framework milieu and 4) the audience. The frameworks can also be examined according to three 
common concepts: 1) shared actions, 2) cyber pillars and 3) the framework life cycle. A total of seven 
shared actions are distilled from the frameworks, while the human, organizational, infrastructure, 
technology and law and regulation pillar are the most frequently discussed excerpts from the CSFs. 
Moreover, there are three processes for securing cyberspace: profiling, delivering and assuring. The 
shared concepts presented in this paper may also be useful for developing a general model of a CSF. 
Keywords: cybersecurity framework, cybersecurity policy, cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity 
shared actions, cyber pillars, framework life cycle 
  
1 Introduction 
The steep rise of digital activity in modern life has created the need for strong cyber resilience. One 
important aspect of developing such resilience is the creation of cybersecurity policies (CSPs) that 
are able to coordinate and reinforce the efforts of a range of stakeholders (Henschke and Ford 2016; 
Pawlak and Barmpaliou 2017; Tiirmaa-Klaar 2016). Guiding policymakers in the development of CSPs 
are cybersecurity frameworks (CSFs). Writing CSFs has been the work of intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions, corporations 
and governments (ITU 2017a). From 2004 to 2015, twelve CSFs have been proposed.  
CSFs are commonly advocated with the intention of helping policymakers to define cybersecurity 
strategy by way of a policy template. Given the proliferation of CSFs, how do policymakers adopt a 
normative position by which to judge their value and utility? CSFs vary widely in terms of, for 
example, engagement focus (global vs. regional), applicability (new vs. existing), and areas of 
improvement (identify vs. address) (ITU, 2016). The needs of countries and organizations vary widely 
in terms of economics and culture, so it is not straightforward to choose a template without 
understanding the underlying assumptions and goals of the framework authors. We found limited 
work comprehensively and systematically reviewing CSFs (i.e. the work of Sabillon et al. 2016). To 
that end, this paper endeavours to develop a ‘bird’s-eye view’ on CSFs to better assist policymakers 
in their deliberations. 
In an attempt to create a single reference outline for all existing frameworks, this paper aims to 
sketch shared concepts underlying the current frameworks. The paper describes the systematic 
extraction of shared concepts using a qualitative coding method (Saldana 2015). Accordingly, the 
paper enables an evidence-based appraisal of current cybersecurity policies.  
2 Domain of cyber security: conundrum 
Although the term cybersecurity is prominently used in modern conversations and statements 
(CCDCOE 2017), this term is regarded as interchangeablewith other security domain terminology, 
such as information security, network security and internet security. As such definitions and 
explanations diverge, questions arise as to whether: (1) cybersecurity is actually information 
security; (2) information security is part of cybersecurity; (3) cyberattacks are uniquely associated 
with information/data; and (4) cybersecurity is replacing information security (von Solms and von 
Solms 2018).  
Apart from such debates, in order to clarify the position taken, we attempt to inclusively consolidate 
some definitions of cybersecurity while simultaneously trying not to be too broad. The following 
narrowed-down definition of ‘cybersecurity’ will be used to delineate the research in this paper. 
Throughout the paper, by cybersecurity we mean: 
securing a virtual digital environment by governance, management and assurance, including 
its assets (i.e. information assets and cyber assets), entities (such as end users, organizations, 
governments, societies, machines and software), and interactions (enabled by IT 
infrastructure, communications/networks, systems and devices) 
(acknowledging definition from ISACA 2013; ISO/IEC 2013; ITU 2012; von Solms and van 
Niekerk 2013; WEF 2012a). 
We also consolidate the definition of ‘framework’ used in this study, since different terms are used 
in each document (see the CSF list in ITU 2016, or refer to Table 1). Although CSFs are expressed by 
different names, and various terms are used, by framework we mean a document that is intended to 
support policymakers in defining their cybersecurity strategies. Throughout this paper, CSF is defined 
as  
a document that is promoted with the intention of helping policymakers (i.e., the 
government or the C-level in an organization) to define cybersecurity strategy/policy by way 
of a policy template.  
Therefore, the term ‘framework’ in this paper is inclusive of the terms ‘agenda’ (ITU 2017b, 2012; 
Schjølberg 2007), ‘cybersecurity strategy’ (EC 2013; OAS 2004), ‘cybersecurity framework’ (BSA 
2010; NIST 2014), ‘model’ (GCSCC 2014), and ‘principles’, ‘guideline’ and ‘manual’ (CTO 2015; 
ISO/IEC 2012; Microsoft 2013; WEF 2012b).  
3 Methodology 
In this paper, we use the grounded theory paradigm to capture the essential concepts shared across 
CSFs as well as the differences between them. Grounded theory is commonly used to illuminate 
concepts based on empirical phenomena and is compatible with an inductive process of analysing 
data (Roman et al. 2017; Scott and Glaser 1967). The specific application of the grounded theory 
paradigm relies on document analysis (Bowen 2009). In doing so, we apply a four-step research 
protocol: 1) defining the research scope, 2) document selection, 3) coding and 4) synthesizing the 
concept (see Figure 1).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
Figure 1. Research protocol 
3.1 Defining the scope of research 
As a guide to achieving this study’s goal, we define three research questions: 
RQ.1 What perspectives and contexts are perceived in CSFs? 
RQ.2 What shared concepts are evident in CSFs? 
RQ.3 What common life cycles are suggested when developing a cybersecurity strategy? 
RQ.1 is intended to compare and contrast CSFs, as their purposes and intentions vary. RQ.2 is 
intended to capture the shared essential concept by distilling the frameworks. Finally, in RQ.3, we 
seek to identify the common lifecycle considered for securing cyberspace.   
3.2 Document selection method 
The method used to collect and select the research artefacts (i.e. appropriate CSF documents) for 
this study is divided into two filtering steps: 1) defining the search strategy and 2) filtering using the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
We limit our search strategy to documents created by IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions, 
corporations and governments intended to guide policymakers in defining cybersecurity strategies 
by way of a policy template. Therefore, the search strategy incorporates the following keywords, 
which are input into internet search engines (e.g. Google, Bing): cybersecurity framework, 
cybersecurity manual, cybersecurity guideline, cybersecurity standard and cybersecurity principle.  
We found 26 documents that are relevant to our search strategy. See Table 1 for a list of the 
documents. 
Table 1. Cybersecurity framework documents 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Next, to narrow our scope, we apply inclusion and exclusion criteria. We define these as follows. 
1. Inclusion criteria: 
a. The document is intended for use as a policy template for cybersecurity strategy, issued 
by any organization; 
b. The document is a complementary document matched to one included under inclusion 
criterion (a) that takes the form of a report, matrix or evaluation; and 
c. The document appears in a publicly available data source.  
2. Exclusion criteria 
a. The document serves as a policy template for another security domain (i.e. information 
security, network security, internet security); 
b. The document is solely intended as a cybersecurity report, matrix or evaluation; 
 
In selecting the relevant framework we decide to omit those which are not aligned to our definition 
(see section 2). For example, the ISO/IEC 27001 framework focuses largely on information security 
but limitedly recognizes the global importance of interaction in cyberspace (ISO/IEC 2013). Similarly, 
some CSFs focus exclusively on IT infrastructure, such as NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
(NERC 2017). We also omit overly operational and overly technical frameworks, since we aim to 
study a policy template. Therefore, there are some frameworks that are not included in this paper 
such as the ETSI Cyber Security Standard (TC CYBER 2018) and RFC 2196 (IETF 1997). Since our 
definitions in section 2 imply that cybersecurity works across national and organizational borders 
(the ITU definition1), this study embraces frameworks that are purposely designed to address 
national interests, such as the Microsoft CSF (Microsoft 2013).  
After applying the inclusion and exclusion criteria, we were left with 17 documents, which fall under 
12 frameworks, as shown in Table 2. The CSF documents for the following analysis were compiled 
from 2004 to 2014. Table 2 shows the list of frameworks sorted by their year of initial creation. 
Table 2. Cybersecurity frameworks from IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions, corporations and governments  
INSERT TABLE 2 
3.3 Coding technique 
Along with the document analysis method, we employ a two-cycle coding technique (Saldaña 2013). 
In the first cycle of coding, we group the concepts using descriptive coding. Concepts are gathered 
and grouped according to the pattern that emerged in each document.  
                                                          
1 “Cybersecurity is information security with jurisdictional uncertainty and attribution issues.” (ITU 2012, p. 11) 
To develop a general understanding, a context is derived based on the patterns that appeared from 
the first cycle. In the second cycle, we use a pattern coding technique (Saldaña 2013). Codes from 
the first cycle are grouped if they share a similar understanding. We used NVIVO software to 
facilitate the coding process. 
Thus, in the next sections, we divide our discussion into two main parts. The first part, which is 
presented in section 4, includes our findings as we compare and contrast the existing frameworks. 
The discussion in this part focuses on elaborating the descriptive coding outcomes: the strategic 
actions, drivers, framework environments and audience of the different CSFs. The second part, 
which is presented in section 5, reports our findings elaborating similar concepts shared across the 
frameworks (coding and synthesis). 
4 Cybersecurity frameworks: the various contexts 
Differences can be detected in every CSF that depend on the framework setting or context. We 
define the context that influences the framework, as each framework has unique aspects or 
distinctive circumstances. We typify the context into four background factors: 1) promoted action, 2) 
driver, 3) milieu and 4) audience.  
The promoted action is the desired or recommended action that links to the core cybersecurity 
programme. The driver is the factor that motivated the creation of the cyber strategy. The milieu is 
the situational setting in which the CSF can be used. The audience is the intended user of the CSF. 
These contexts are summarized in Table 3. Each aspect will be discussed in sub-sections 4.1 to 4.5. 
Table 3. Various contexts of cybersecurity frameworks 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
4.1 The promoted action 
The promoted action is the approach that the framework recommends the organization take before 
implementing its cybersecurity strategy. The overall defined direction of the promoted action 
further describes the conduct of the cyber strategy. The promoted actions in CSFs can be classified 
into two main categories. The first category promotes collaborative action (outward strategy), while 
in contrast, the second type advocates increasing the cyber capacity of the organization (inward 
strategy).  
The first type, positive interdependence, which emphasizes collaborative action, promotes 
cooperation among the entities in cyberspace. It adopts the idea that cybersecurity is a shared 
responsibility given the challenges associated with the interdependencies of all cyberspace 
stakeholders (BSA 2010; EC 2013; ISO/IEC 2012; Schjølberg 2007). Therefore, securing cyberspace is 
not solely the responsibility of one organization; instead, it should become a shared endeavour and 
thus requires partnership among the stakeholders (WEF 2012a). This type includes CSFs such as the 
ISO/IEC 27032, WEF Principles and Guidelines, ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda, OAS Cybersecurity 
Strategy and CTO Cybersecurity Guidelines.  
In contrast to externally-directed strategic action, the other type of promoted action advocates an 
inward process and promotes fortifying the organization internally through cyber capacity-building. 
While the outward promoted action focuses on collaborating to combat cyberthreats, it is also 
essential for an organization to have sufficient cyber capacity to be a trusted and strong entity within 
the network (WEF 2012b). Therefore, some CSFs, such as Oxford University CMM and the NIST 
Framework, advocate increasing organizational capacity-building, for example by building human 
resource capacity, strengthening critical information infrastructures, and strengthening internal 
systems (i.e. regulations, laws and organizational structure).  
 
4.2 The drivers 
The analysis of CSFs suggests that cybersecurity strategy can be driven by two factors: risk and 
values. Risk-centric and value-centric drivers are found to influence actions and the overall 
development of a cybersecurity strategy. The goal of the first factor, the risk-centric driver, is to 
minimize the risks caused by cyberthreats. This common driver holds a justified role within 
cybersecurity strategy because cyberspace is characterized by uncertainty, and risk needs to be 
assessed and managed (ISACA 2013; Microsoft 2013; NIST 2014). 
While some CSFs emphasize preventing the risks caused by cyberthreats, others advise focusing on 
aligning the values of the organization such as a national commitment or business goals with the 
cybersecurity strategy. Therefore, the second factor, the value-centric driver, appears in certain 
contexts to indicate that the creation of the cybersecurity strategy was driven or framed by a certain 
value (or the country’s commitment/outcome-focus thereto (CTO 2015; Klimburg 2012)). For such, 
drivers that are influenced by the country’s commitment can be derived from a state declaration, 
whether it is directed by the state or by other states (i.e. through treaty) to 
organizations/communities (i.e. mandates and charters), to private entities/societies (i.e. 
expectations and political considerations) (Klimburg 2012, pp. 146–90), or based on national values 
(Schaake and Vermeulen 2016). Within this value-centric context, creating cyber policy means 
regarding cyberspace not only as an insulated single domain but also as a domain involving the 
political situation and national strategy (Klimburg 2012). Therefore, securing cyberspace implicates a 
dynamic situation. For example, the Commonwealth CSF encourages alignment with Commonwealth 
values, such as protecting fundamental human rights, preserving an open, free and secure 
cyberspace, increasing democracy, maintaining international peace and security, and encouraging 
sustainable development (CTO 2015). Within the organization, this can take the form of aligning the 
business strategy to the security strategy (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014), meaning attaching the 
cybersecurity function based on the business environment, business values, business purposes, 
business objectives and security purposes (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014). 
The CSFs that advocate for value-centric drivers can be found primarily in the IGO CSFs, such as in 
the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Strategy Guidelines, EU Cybersecurity Strategy, CCDCOE Cyber 
Security Framework and ITU-GCA (see Table 4), where the main intention is to promote their 
institutional values. 
Table 4. Aspiring value-centric drivers for developing cyber strategy 
INSERT TABLE 4 
4.3 The framework milieu 
Within the range of CSFs, a single framework cannot be adopted and directly implemented by an 
organization without knowing whether the environment is suitable. For example, the NIST 
Framework is not suitable for promoting interdependence, as it was developed for implementation 
by the owner of national critical information infrastructure (NIST 2014). Each framework has a 
different context and scope, which we call the framework milieu. The framework milieu is the 
background and the context for the framework.  
Viewing the scope of the milieu, some frameworks are intended to provide a solution at the 
organizational level, while others are intended for use at the regional level or the international level 
(which requires a positive interdependence between international cyber entities). At the 
organizational level, taking the NIST Framework and CMM as examples, the framework can be 
appropriately implemented given only a narrow scope within the internal organizational setting, 
such as to strengthen the organization’s cyber capacity or critical information infrastructure. Other 
frameworks, such as the ITU-GCA, have a broad scope, which can only work in international 
circumstances that need positive interdependence between each entity, such as through 
international cooperation and collaboration. Further frameworks only work for particular audiences. 
These are usually frameworks that are built for a member of an IGO that has shared institutional 
values, such as the Commonwealth Cybersecurity Guidelines and the CCDCOE Manual. In this case, 
the primary purpose of this framework is to engage with each member sharing the institutional 
values. 
Based on those cases, we can divide the environmental setting (milieu) into three levels with respect 
to their different circumstances, engagement and scope: the first level is the organizational level, the 
second is the regional level, and the third is the international level. The organizational level typically 
addresses increasing the capacity of the organization, while the other two target positive 
interdependence. The organizational framework can be used as a framework complementary to a 
higher-level framework; for example, the CMM, ISACA and NIST frameworks can be used to 
strengthen the organizational level, while the organization may also implement another high-level 
framework alongside an organizational type framework. The regional framework is typically built to 
address the specific needs of the country members, which have similar shared institutional values, 
such as the OAS Cybersecurity Strategy for OAS members or the Commonwealth Cybersecurity 
Guidelines for Commonwealth countries. Finally, the international framework type emphasizes 
positive interdependence that is cooperative and collaborative with any organization with the same 
interests. 
4.4 The audiences  
The audience or the intended users of CSFs can be divided into two audience categories: (1) the 
audience-specific CSF and (2) the across-the-board CSF. CSFs with the first type of audience are 
primarily devoted and addressed to specific organizations that share institutional values within the 
originating organization. Therefore, these CSFs are created for a specific type of audience. For 
example, the NIST Framework was developed in response to Presidential Executive Order 136362, as 
this framework was initially built for the critical information infrastructure operator in the United 
States of America. Other examples include CSFs that were built by an IGO, such as the OAS 
Cybersecurity Strategy, the EU Cybersecurity Strategy and the Commonwealth Cybersecurity 
Guidelines, which were created for their country members by an IGO and aligned with the IGO’s 
mission. This occurred because most IGOs, such as OAS, ITU, EU/ENISA, NATO/CCDCOE and CTO, 
                                                          
2 The Presidential Executive Order 13636 (“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,”) was issued on 12 
February 2013 and calls for the development of a voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework (NIST 
Framework). 
developed their CSFs with a focus on advocating their country members’ creation of a cybersecurity 
strategy. 
The second type of CSF has general applicability in terms of its audience and focuses on helping 
organizations increase their capacity to reduce cyberthreats; these can be used by any organization, 
without them needing to share a similar institutional value background. This type of CSF is usually 
built by NGOs and academic institutions, such as the University of Oxford, ISO/IEC, Microsoft or the 
BSA.  
While the context of CSFs can be divided into four categories, which are the promoted action 
(positive independence vs. increasing capacity), the drivers (risk-centric vs. value-centric), the 
framework milieu (organizational, regional and international), and the audience (audience-specific 
vs. across-the-board), frameworks can have demi-classifications, meaning that it is possible for 
classifications to fall between categories. For example, while the NIST Framework was developed 
based on the Presidential Executive Order, it can be used by organizations or critical infrastructure 
companies outside the USA. A similar situation is observed for the WEF Framework, which is 
intended for its members who focus on securing economic relationships. However, the principles 
and guidelines in the framework can potentially be adopted globally by any organization. 
5 Cybersecurity frameworks: shared concepts 
Although there are various perspectives on and contexts for CSFs, we also see that there are some 
similarities shared across the frameworks. For example, the CMM Section D2-1 mentions the Cyber 
Security Mindset (GCSCC 2014, pp. 19–20), which is similar to the Commonwealth Cybersecurity 
Guideline ‘developing a culture of Cybersecurity awareness among citizens’ (CTO 2015, p. 11). 
Considering these two concepts, we can see that they share a similar principle, which is developing a 
cyber culture. To extract this shared concept, we use two cycles of coding as described earlier: 
descriptive coding and pattern coding.  
The first cycle is descriptive coding, which aims to excerpt similar concepts from the frameworks into 
codes. We find that there are thirty shared concepts from the documents (see Figure 2 and Table 5). 
The second cycle summarizes the thirty concepts into a smaller number of sets or themes to gain a 
better normative position of the current frameworks. Using pattern coding, we assemble the thirty 
codes into two main themes, which are 1) based on similar actions and 2) based on objects that need 
to be secured (we call this a cyber pillar).  
The process behind these two cycles of coding is presented in Figure 2. The middle figure represents 
shared concepts identified in the documents. The figure on the left represents the cybersecurity 
pillar. These pillars are used to support and underpin cybersecurity. The figure on the right 
represents the shared actions. The frameworks commonly promote these actions to secure 
cyberspace.  
We also highlight the common life cycle of securing cyberspace, which is called the cybersecurity life 
cycle. The cybersecurity life cycle is a series of processes and a step-by-step routine for securing 
cyberspace as a project that usually comprises the processes of initial planning, process 
implementation and evaluation. 
These findings will be elaborated upon in the next sections. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Figure 2. Theme development process 
5.1 Cybersecurity framework actions 
Table 5 shows the concepts shared among CSFs. We have composed the shared concepts from the 
12 frameworks using NVIVO and descriptive coding. In Table 5, we group the shared concepts into 
themes based on their similarity of action (see the shaded columns) using pattern coding. We found 
that there were seven themes that contribute to the CSF: building online trust, creating 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration, profiling the cyber state, promoting uptake, reviewing, 
establishing a legal environment, and creating standards. A detailed discussion will be elaborated in 
sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7. 
Table 5. Shared concepts of cybersecurity frameworks 
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
5.1.1 Building online trust 
In creating a cybersecurity strategy, some CSFs recommend that policy creation should focus on 
enhancing the confidence of stakeholders in the online environment or building online trust. It 
means not only giving stakeholders (e.g. consumer, business and the government) confidence in the 
online form (BSA 2010) but also ensuring the availability of infrastructure (in other words, increasing 
the resilience of infrastructure and servicing critical information infrastructure (ITU 2012)). This can 
be achieved, for example, by providing a data protection and privacy regulation framework (BSA 
2010), developing a national cyber contingency plan/national crisis management (EC 2013; Klimburg 
2012), and providing critical information protection (Klimburg 2012). 
There are three shared concepts that contribute to building online trust: 
1. Increasing digital redundancy: to maintain resilience and capabilities of services that are 
impaired due to a cybersecurity event. 
2. Protecting critical assets in cyberspace: to protect intangible and tangible critical assets, such 
as privacy, data and infrastructure. 
3. Promoting privacy online: to protect personally identifiable information against 
unauthorized access and disclosure. 
5.1.2 Coordination, cooperation and collaboration 
Given the wide range of cybersecurity protection necessary, including protection at the personal, 
societal, organizational, national and international levels as well as securing global cyberspace, it 
cannot be handled solely by one entity. Protecting cyberspace requires cooperation from every 
entity, and moreover, the cyber environment needs a cumulative defence. This means that each 
entity needs to continually work to maintain (and improve) its cyber capacity in order to be a trusted 
player in cyberspace (WEF 2015). As a result, protecting cyberspace demands action to ensure 
coordination, cooperation and collaboration with all cybersecurity stakeholders. 
There are two types of recommended actions on coordination, cooperation and collaboration (CCC). 
We can divide the actions related to the organizational relationship into external and internal 
actions. The first category involves outreach to other entities through cooperation and collaboration. 
Outreach can be achieved, for example, through alliances and partnerships with other organizations, 
empowering cyber diplomacy and soft power, conducting information sharing on combating threats, 
sharing responsibility by promoting inclusion, and increasing the cyber capacity of neighbouring 
entities (or uptake by third parties).  
The second category involves increasing internal coordination (or inward coordination) within an 
entity’s organizational structure. This type of action is intended to increase communication to all of 
the entity stakeholders, coordinate all entity stakeholders regarding the cybersecurity mandate, and 
create cyber governance with clear roles and responsibilities. 
5.1.3 Profiling the cyber state 
Some CSFs recommend measuring the needs and objectives at hand before taking action on 
protecting cyberspace; this is called profiling the cyber state. The profiling action includes setting 
goals and related resources that are needed to secure cyberspace, which is a preliminary, 
preparatory action before the next action begins. Three actions are part of profiling the cyber state: 
aligning strategy with core values; budgeting and preparing related resources; and formulating 
assumptions. 
The first advised action, aligning strategy, is intended to establish conduct that is coherent with the 
current core values. The core values should apply as much in cyberspace as in the physical world; for 
example, they should align with the current business processes (ISACA 2013; NIST 2014). When used 
at a higher level, such as at the country level, such core values may refer to an existing arrangement 
(or country commitment), which can be derived from a state declaration such as a treaty, mandate, 
charter, public expectation or political decision (Klimburg 2012, pp. 146–90). 
The second action, budgeting and resourcing, entails defining budgets and resources prior to 
implementation, such as people, service and infrastructure, and funding. This includes, for example, 
allocating and ensuring adequate resources (BSA 2010; CTO 2015; GCSCC 2014; ISACA 2013; 
Microsoft 2013), taking stock of the status of key elements of the strategy (ENISA 2012a), and 
pairing and assigning goals to resources using metrics (ISACA 2013; Klimburg 2012; NIST 2014). 
The third action, formulating assumptions, means assessing what the organization needs in the 
context of the cyber environment. This includes, for example, creating risk profiles, profiling the 
assets that should be protected, determining what security requirements are needed, assessing 
vulnerabilities, establishing pre-conditions, and setting the overall goals or target to be achieved. 
Actions in this step are intended to describe the organization’s cybersecurity posture and target its 
cybersecurity state as well as to identify and prioritize the context. 
5.1.4 Promoting uptake 
Promoting uptake means increasing an entity’s cyber capacity by promoting the adoption of CSF. In 
addition to CCC, it is also important to consider actions in relation to other entities in cyberspace 
(which is discussed in section 5.1.2). Promoting uptake can be considered a significant aspect of this 
relationship because, to strengthen cybersecurity, it is important to be a trusted organization in 
cyberspace. The CCC actions and promoting uptake are intertwined. While the CCC reflects outward 
action to collaborate with all entities and stakeholders, the primary intention of promoting uptake is 
internally directed strategic action to strengthen the entity so that it is trusted in cyberspace (WEF 
2012b).  
Promoting uptake means creating a strong cyber environment by empowering various entities 
(people, the society, organizations and the country). Such action can take the form of increasing 
awareness, building a cyber culture, investing in research and innovation, using innovative 
technology, increasing cyber responsiveness, and conducting training and education on 
cybersecurity. 
5.1.5 Reviewing 
Action taken to secure cyberspace also needs to be reviewed to ensure that the cybersecurity 
programme is delivering on its targets. Reviewing is intended to readjust the strategy and to realign 
the programme to achieve the intended goal. Examples of such actions include creating audits and 
logs, receiving feedback, conducting self-assessments, and refining the programme. 
Creating audits and logs entails establishing due care and analysis of the current implementation. 
Audits and logs make it possible to record security incidents, which in turn allows the organization to 
better apprise, understand and react to the current threat landscape and readjust its strategy to 
achieve the goal (CTO 2015; ENISA 2014; GCSCC 2014; NIST 2014). Audits and logs can also be used 
to verify compliance relevant to cyber risk exposure (WEF 2012b).  
Aside from creating audits and logs, action also needs to be assessed. Programme assessment can be 
conducted internally or by involving an outside observer. The first approach is pursued by 
conducting self-assessments, for example, by creating metrics or key performance indicators (KPIs) 
(CTO 2015; ENISA 2012b; Microsoft 2013), continuous monitoring (WEF 2012b), and benchmarking 
(GCSCC 2014). The second approach is pursued by receiving feedback. Receiving feedback means 
involving an outside observer to report on incidents or misconduct activities. An internal observer 
might miss certain weaknesses, so by receiving feedback from an outsider the organization gains the 
advantage of using another perspective to improve the programme. Taking this feedback can take 
the form of organizing cyber exercises (ENISA 2014), receiving feedback from an individual expert or 
receiving feedback from societies (GCSCC 2014). Programme refinement is the ultimate goal of this 
step. The aim here is to refine the programme and evaluate it to improve strategy to the extent that 
continuous improvement is achieved. Evaluating and adjusting the cybersecurity strategy can be 
achieved by identifying lessons, good practices and bad practices during each activity (ENISA 2012b), 
and by creating audits and logs and through assessment. 
5.1.6 Establishing a legal environment 
The legal environment provides a basis for conduct in cyberspace that draws a border between what 
is permissible and what is misconduct. Appropriate laws and regulations are needed to prevent and 
deter misconduct (OAS 2004). Most CSFs advise the organization to determine what legal conduct is 
and to establish a legal environment. Establishing a legal environment involves creating a legal 
framework as a basis for distinguishing between legal and illegal activities in cyberspace. Establishing 
a legal environment can also be used as a rationale to take corrective action against malicious 
activities in cyberspace. The theme of establishing a legal environment is distilled from the shared 
action included in some frameworks, ranging from defining policies to creating strategies and 
frameworks to policy enforcement. 
Defining policies means creating a legal rationale for conduct. When defining such policy, the CSFs 
recommend considering some specific aspects: 
1. The policy should recognize the nature of the internet (BSA 2010; EC 2013), meaning that it 
should preserve openness and the free flow of information (EC 2013; OECD 2012). 
2. The policy should keep pace with all aspects of modern cybercriminal activity (BSA 2010; 
NIST 2014). 
3. The policy should encourage cooperation and be designed using existing international and 
regional frameworks as references (EC 2013; GCSCC 2014; ITU 2012; NIST 2014; OAS 2004; 
Schjølberg 2007). 
4. The policy should be used to minimize risk and as a form of deterrence against misuse (CTO 
2015; ISO/IEC 2012; OAS 2004; WEF 2015). 
Policy implementation should also create a strategy and framework, meaning it must develop a 
strategy, mechanism and roadmap that function as a tactical or even a direct mandate to secure 
cyberspace. Implementation is intended to actually deliver operational national cybersecurity 
(Klimburg 2012). The strategy and framework should responsively adapt to changing socio-political, 
threat and technology environments and integrate across all policy domains (GCSCC 2014; ITU 
2017b; WEF 2014). 
One important pillar in establishing the legal environment is enacting laws, which can be done by 
law enforcement. Law enforcement means enacting cybersecurity law by taking corrective action in 
response to misconduct. Since cybercrime rings span the globe and have a broad set of stakeholders 
and a broad scope, there are some advised considerations for law enforcement: 
1. Law enforcement should be employed as a tool to deter and punish cybercrime (BSA 2010; 
Schjølberg 2007). 
2. Law enforcement must engage across jurisdictions; therefore, addressing cybercrime 
demands international cooperation and coordination (BSA 2010; ENISA 2012b; Schjølberg 
2007). 
3. Enforcing the law in cyberspace requires a comprehensive understanding of both innovative 
technology and appropriate legal approaches, as well as sufficient specialized resources and 
capabilities (i.e. investigators, prosecutors and judges) to cover cybercrime offences (BSA 
2010; GCSCC 2014; Schjølberg 2007; WEF 2014). 
 
5.1.7 Creating standards 
Protecting cyberspace requires effective and efficient action, which can be realized by adopting best 
practices and standardizing conduct. These can be accomplished by creating a standard, which also 
means promoting interoperability and systemizing conduct.  
Promoting interoperability means following recognized cybersecurity standards that are accepted 
internationally. There are some recognized standards from standards organizations that can be 
employed as a policy template, guideline or technology (OAS 2004).  
Organizations can also standardize their conduct by developing and establishing a minimum 
requirement of conduct. An example of this is creating practical and effective implementation 
programmes and technical guidelines. This action aims to minimize overlapping action between one 
entity and others. For example, the Law Enforcement Governance Framework, which standardizes 
legal conduct, is used to minimize overlapping functions and structures across investigatory, 
policymaking and regulatory bodies against cybercrime (ITU 2012). 
5.2 Cybersecurity pillars 
In addition to grouping shared concepts into certain themes, we can also see that, from another 
perspective, the CSFs discuss securing similar objects. In this context, we call these objects pillars. As 
in a building’s structure, these pillars are used to support and underpin cybersecurity, and they need 
to be strengthened together. The shared concepts of the CSF can be merged into similar objects or 
pillars.  
Through the theme development process, as depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3, we conclude that 
there are five main pillars that build cybersecurity: human, organizational, infrastructure, technology 
and law and regulation. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
Figure 3. The five pillars of cybersecurity 
The human pillar is the most fundamental, and arguably the weakest, element of cybersecurity that 
needs to be secured. While the cyberspace foundation is built by technology, the human drives and 
controls it (ISACA 2013, pp. 72–4). Since humans represent the main actor enabling cybersecurity, 
lack of awareness and insufficient knowledge makes humans the major challenge and the most 
vulnerable pillar relative to the others. In addition, addressing knowledge inadequacies is not a 
straightforward task as it requires education, training and time. This is the reason why CSFs 
recommend promoting uptake by increasing awareness, developing a cybersecurity culture, and 
providing training and education to strengthen this pillar.  
The organizational pillar focuses on the institutions inside cyberspace. It is the functional structure 
that controls cyberspace. Strengthening this pillar can be further separated into two tactics, namely, 
(1) internally directed strategic action such as increasing the capacity and capability of the 
organization and (2) externally directed strategic action, which is intensifying cooperation to secure 
cyberspace. For example, the first tactic can be realized by securing the budget and resources for the 
organization and increasing responsiveness to cyberthreats. However, each organization in 
cyberspace also needs to cooperate with the others, such as by creating clear roles and 
responsibilities for each organization, coordinating stakeholders, sharing information on threats, and 
creating alliances and partnerships. 
The infrastructure pillar is the most critical element of cyberspace. It is the environment that 
constitutes cyberspace. Without infrastructure, cyberspace is nothing; therefore, strengthening this 
pillar is necessary for supporting the cyber environment. If this pillar is weak, transactions in 
cyberspace could collapse. Therefore, most CSFs address infrastructure issues, including how to 
secure critical information infrastructure. The NIST Framework is the most pertinent for securing the 
critical information infrastructure. In most cases, the CII differs from one organization to another, 
depending on each organization’s needs and cyber profile. 
The technology pillar is the pillar that empowers cyberspace. As cyberspace comprises the most 
advanced technology (ITU and ABIresearch 2014), strengthening this pillar primarily entails adopting 
the leading technology, such as by espousing technology that supports cybersecurity and enabling 
research and development. 
The law and regulation pillar structures cybersecurity and creates a coercive environment in 
cyberspace. This pillar focuses on strengthening the systems within cyberspace, such as creating a 
national cyber ecosystem by creating a regulatory framework and creating norms and standards, as 
well as law enforcement. Although some argue that cyberspace should not be regulated and should 
remain free from government and politics (Barlow 1996), legal conduct is still needed to maintain 
stability in cyberspace.  
It is interesting to reflect on the ITU pillars and contrast these with the pillars outlined above. The 
ITU pillars divide cybersecurity into five working areas – legal, technical and procedural, 
organizational, capacity-building and international cooperation. 
We argue that the five above-mentioned pillars may best describe the critical cyber aspects inside an 
institution that need to be strengthened. The pillars depicted in Figure 2 cover comprehensive 
aspects of building cybersecurity and are grounded in 12 recognizable frameworks.  
Three of the five ITU working areas (technical and procedural, organizational and international 
cooperation) can be covered by the organization pillar. This organization pillar acts as the functional 
structure that controls cyberspace, which according to the finding overarches two main functions: 
inward strategic action (increasing the capacity and capability of the organization, which 
encompasses the technical and procedural, capacity-building and organizational pillars of ITU), and 
outward strategic action (intensifying cooperation to secure cyberspace, as in the international 
cooperation pillar in the ITU work area).  
We also note that there are two main aspects that are not covered by the ITU work areas: the 
infrastructure and technology pillars. These two pillars are the foundation that build cyberspace. 
While we recognize that capacity-building is important for building up cybersecurity, we tend to 
include it as an embedded aspect in the human and organization pillars. 
5.3 Cybersecurity framework life cycle 
Implementing a cybersecurity project is not straightforward, with the organization building a 
strategy and deploying actions, and the programme being run as planned; accordingly, it must be a 
repeatable process, incorporating continuous improvement, monitoring and analysis (ENISA 2014; 
ISACA 2013). Therefore, some CSFs recommend following a continuous, step-by-step process. We 
define this as the cybersecurity life cycle.  
Accordingly, the cybersecurity life cycle is a series of processes and a step-by-step routine for 
securing cyberspace as a project; it comprises the processes of initial planning, process 
implementation and evaluation. The output of the evaluation phase is used to maintain and adjust 
the strategy (ENISA 2012b, p. 7) and as an input for replanning cyber strategy. As we can associate 
securing cyberspace with a project, this process can be found in nearly every framework. An 
example of this life cycle is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6. Cybersecurity framework life cycle 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
From Table 7, we can see that the life cycle process comprises three common steps: profiling the 
cyber state, delivering the strategy, and evaluation. The profiling process is intended to profile the 
current cyber situation, i.e. to identify, plan, determine requirements, set targets, profile and assess 
the current situation of the cyber state. The second step, which is the main step, is to deliver the 
programme, namely, to execute the programme and facilitate implementation. The last step is an 
evaluation of the programme, a review of the results, and an adjustment of the strategy. Evaluation 
results from the final step are employed to refine the programme and used in cybersecurity 
replanning. Those steps are found in all CSFs; they are excerpted from the various terms but refer to 
similar concepts.  
Table 7. Cybersecurity life cycle map 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
Since the overall life cycle comprises important life cycle processes, the common understanding of 
the life cycle can be divided into profiling, delivering and assuring, allowing the life cycle to be 
mapped (as shown in Table 7). The three processes combine into a continuous process, which is 
drawn as a cyclic process model in Figure 4. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
Figure 4. Three processes of cybersecurity  
The profiling process is intended to define the current cyber state. Various terms are used to refer to 
profiling. For example, ISO uses ‘plan’, ITU uses ‘ends’, NATO uses ‘preliminary consideration’, WEF 
uses ‘starting assumption’, Microsoft uses ‘establishing clear priorities and security baselines’, CTO 
uses ‘approach’ and ISACA uses ‘plan and design’. These common terms refer to a process taken 
before cybersecurity is implemented. The profiling process is a planning process created by 
developing the assumptions, aligning with core values, budgeting, gathering resources and 
establishing a legal environment. 
The delivering process is the core action for securing cyberspace. This process should be pursued 
based on the assumptions listed in the profiling process. Some CSFs use an explicit term such as 
‘protect’ (NIST), ‘do’ (ISO), ‘ways-means’ (ITU) or ‘implement and operate’ (ISACA), while others use 
implicit terms that primarily describe the main actions in the CSF. The delivering process entails 
implementing actions for securing cyberspace based on the assumptions developed in the profiling 
process, such as building online trust, creating CCC and promoting uptake. 
The assuring process is the review of the overall process of delivering and the result of feedback 
gathered to ensure a better cybersecurity process. Cyber assurance is a way to reshape the quality of 
cybersecurity output that meets the desired goal. The assuring process entails reappraisal (i.e. audit, 
feedback, self-assessment and creating metrics), modification (in response to the internal and 
external situation) and refinement (of operation and strategy).  
5.4 Cybersecurity framework: shared concept mapping 
The two perspectives of pillars and life cycles can be combined to create a generalized cybersecurity 
strategy (See Table 8). The first view is of the process to secure cyberspace, which mainly falls into 
profiling, delivering and assuring. The second view considers what objects need to be strengthened 
in cyberspace or the cybersecurity pillars, namely, human, organization, infrastructure, technology, 
and law and regulatory.  
As we can see in Table 8, strengthening the five cyber pillars can be divided into (1) profiling the 
current cyber state, (2) delivering the security actions based on the profile, and (3) ensuring that the 
security delivery is on track and provides feedback to the first process. Table 8 shows the overall 
shared concept of a CSF. 
Table 8. Summary of cybersecurity framework 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
6 Concluding remarks and limitations 
This paper began with the aim of identifying shared concepts across 12 CSFs and classifying their 
differences. Using the grounded theory paradigm, we divide the CSFs into two main parts: context 
and shared concepts.  
In seeking cybersecurity policy, one noteworthy question to ask is what drives its development 
(Pawlak and Barmpaliou 2017, p. 124). This question leads to comprehending organizations’ 
initiatives on developing CSFs through apprehending the CSFs’ distinctive features. In this study, we 
found that the development of CSFs can generally be reflected by: 1) promoted action (positive 
interdependence vs. increasing capacity), 2) driver (cyber risk vs. promoting values), 3) framework 
milieu (organizational, regional and international), and 4) audience (audience-specific vs. the across-
the-board CSF).  
In addition, understanding CSFs as a normative concept is an ongoing endeavour. As indicated in the 
work of the ITU (2018) there is a desire to develop generic strategies that can be applied globally, 
such as by creating a cybersecurity toolkit. Therefore, addressing the question that leads to the 
development of general cybersecurity concepts contributes to the development of a general model 
of cybersecurity policy.  
Attempting to respond to that inquiry, this study has mapped the normative position of CSF onto 
three central concepts, encompassing the seven action themes, five pillars/objects and three-process 
life cycle. The seven action themes that are frequently discussed in the CSFs are, namely, 1) building 
online trust; 2) coordination, cooperation and collaboration, 3) profiling the cyber state, 4) promoting 
uptake, 5) reviewing, 6) establishing a legal environment, and 7) creating standards. We also raise 
five pillars or cybersecurity objects that are most often discussed in CSFs, namely, human, 
organization, infrastructure, technology and law and regulation. In addition, the three-process life 
cycle includes profiling, delivering and assuring.  
This work contributes in several ways. Policymakers or C-level executives could benefit from the 
depiction of distinctive features summarized in section 4, which may help them in choosing the right 
policy template for their organizational purpose. Section 4 provides a normative position on existing 
CSFs. By narrowing down the organizational purpose and searching for the best-fit context for their 
organization, policymakers and C-level executives can select a suitable CSF for their organization. For 
example, a company may use the NIST framework, CMM or ISACA framework as their policy 
template, as these are suitable for increasing the cyber capacity of the internal organization, rather 
than emphasizing an international relationship, which we would find in other CSFs such as the ITU 
framework and Microsoft Cybersecurity Manual. To that end, policymakers seeking to develop a 
cybersecurity strategy can allocate resources to areas that will contribute to its successful 
implementation. It is also potentially possible to allocate these resources over a time period to 
account for the different areas of development of the life cycle. 
Researchers could benefit from reviewing the mapping concept of the CSF summarized in Table 8. 
The seven shared actions, the five pillars and the three life cycles are mapped in this table, providing 
researchers with a bird’s-eye view of current CSFs. This mapped table can also be used for 
developing a general model of a CSF, since the finding comprehensively covers all elements in every 
CSF strategy.  
In future development of this work, the five pillars, three life cycles and seven shared actions 
identified in Table 8 may be used as an instrument to benchmark cybersecurity progress in an 
institution as a Cybersecurity Balanced Scorecard. A dashboard containing the five pillars can be 
used to monitor the development of cybersecurity, since these pillars thoroughly cover all aspects of 
CSFs that need to be watched, while at the axis, the three life cycles can be used to monitor state 
progress for developing cybersecurity, such as in the beginning state (profiling), executing state 
(delivering) and reviewing state (assuring). In addition, the seven shared actions in the cross-section 
cell can be used to advocate a direction to policymakers or C-level executives when taking required 
action. Features in the finding were simplified and summarized but embrace all strategies. 
While the distinctive features and shared concepts raised in this paper reflect a number of themes 
identified in the CSFs and represent several contributions of this paper, the paper also has some 
potential limitations. First, although this paper did not intend to oversimplify the concepts involved 
in securing cyberspace in all CSFs, grouping a number of concepts and paragraphs into a concise 
view, however, potentially detracts from the essential concept brought by each CSF. Consider the 
example of when we discussed the profiling theme: we defined profiling the cyber state as 
generically as we could. It can refer to profiling the cyber state of the organization as well as profiling 
the cyber state in a larger institution, such as a country. However, we attempted to avoid 
oversimplifying the concepts gathered from the CSFs. Second, this work has been conducted by a 
group of researchers. Therefore, the discussion reflects the researchers’ views of the overall CSF 
during the work. Third, we made limited use of document analysis alone as the main methodology in 
this work (Bowen 2009). However, the literature suggests using document analysis alongside other 
methodologies to corroborate findings, such as by triangulating data or employing mixed-methods 
studies. 
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Table 1. Cybersecurity framework documents 
Years Documents 
2004 A Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: a Multidimensional and 
Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity (OAS 2004) 
2007 The Report of the Chairman of High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) on the ITU Global 
Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA) (Schjølberg 2007) 
2009 Cybersecurity Guide for Developing Countries (ITU 2009) 
2010 BSA Global Cybersecurity Framework (BSA 2010) 
2012 Cybersecurity Policy Making at a Turning Point: Analysing a New Generation of National 
Cybersecurity Strategies for the internet Economy (OECD 2012) 
2012 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience 
(WEF 2012) 
2012 National Cyber Security Strategies: Setting the course for national efforts to strengthen 
security in cyberspace (ENISA 2012b) 
2012 ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (ITU 2012) 
2012 Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World - 
Principles and Guidelines (WEF 2012a) 
2012 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience 
(WEF 2012b)  
2012 National Cyber Security Framework Manual (Klimburg 2012) 
2012 ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology — Security techniques — Guidelines for 
cybersecurity (ISO/IEC 2012) 
2012 National Cyber Security Strategies: Practical Guide on Development and Execution (ENISA 
2012a) 
2013 ISO/IEC 27001:2013 - Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 2013) 
2013 Transforming Cyber Security (ISACA 2013) 
2013 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (EC 
2013) 
2013 Developing a National Strategy for Cybersecurity: Foundations for Security, Growth, and 
Innovation (Microsoft 2013) 
2014 An Evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security Strategies (ENISA 2014) 
2014 Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: Implications for Enterprises (WEF 
2014) 
2014 Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (NIST 2014) 
2014 Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (CMM) (GCSCC 2014) 
2014 Commonwealth Cybergovernance Model (Commonwealth 2014) 
2015 Cyber Maturity in the Asia-Pacific Region 2015 (ASPI 2015) 
2015 Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Towards the Quantification of Cyber Threats (WEF 2015) 
2015 Commonwealth Approach for Developing National Cybersecurity Strategies: A guide to 
creating a cohesive and inclusive approach to delivering a safe, secure and resilient 
cyberspace (CTO 2015) 
2017 Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) (ITU and ABIresearch 2014, 2015; ITU 2017a) 
 





[1]  2004 Organization of 
American States (OAS) 
Cybersecurity Strategy 
A Comprehensive Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy: a 
Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating a 
Culture of Cybersecurity (OAS 2004) 
[2]  2007 Global Cybersecurity 
Agenda  
(ITU-GCA) 
• The Report of the Chairman of High-Level Experts 
Group (HLEG) on the ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda 
(GCA) (Schjølberg 2007) 
• ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (ITU 2012) 
• Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) (ITU and ABIresearch 
2014, 2015; ITU 2017a) 
[3]  2010 Business Software 
Alliance (BSA) 
Framework 
BSA Global Cybersecurity Framework (BSA 2010) 




• Partnering for Cyber Resilience: Risk and Responsibility 
in a Hyperconnected World – Principles and Guidelines 
(WEF 2012a) 
• Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: 
Pathways to Global Cyber Resilience (WEF 2012b)  
• Risk and Responsibility in a Hyperconnected World: 
Implications for Enterprises (WEF 2014) 
[5]  2012 Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of 
Excellence 
(CCDCOE) Manual 
National Cyber Security Framework Manual (Klimburg 2012) 
[6]  2012 ISO 27032 ISO/IEC 27032:2012 Information technology — Security 
techniques — Guidelines for cybersecurity (ISO/IEC 2012) 
[7]  2012 European Union (EU) 
Cybersecurity Strategy  
• National Cyber Security Strategies: Practical Guide on 
Development and Execution (ENISA 2012a) 
• Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An 
Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace (EC 2013) 
[8]  2013 Microsoft 
Cybersecurity Manual 
Developing a National Strategy for Cybersecurity: Foundations 
for Security, Growth, and Innovation (Microsoft 2013) 
[9]  2013 ISACA Cybersecurity 
Nexus 
Transforming Cybersecurity (ISACA 2013) 




Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
(NIST 2014) 
[11] 2014 Cyber Security 
Capability Maturity 
Model (CMM) 
Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (GCSCC 2014) 
[12] 2015 Commonwealth 
Cybersecurity 
Guidelines 
• Commonwealth Approach for Developing National 
Cybersecurity Strategies: a guide to creating a cohesive 
and inclusive approach to delivering a safe, secure and 








Table 3. Various contexts of cybersecurity frameworks 










Value-centric International ITU members 
2010 BSA Framework 
• Positive 
interdependence  
• Increasing cyber 
capacity 
Risk-centric International Government 
2012 WEF Principles and Guidelines 
• Positive 
interdependence  
• Increasing cyber 
capacity 
Risk-centric International WEF members 
2012 CCDCOE Manual 
• Positive 
interdependence  
• Increasing cyber 
capacity 
Value-centric Regional NATO members 
2012 ISO27032 
Positive 







• Increasing cyber 
capacity 




































Table 4. Aspiring value-centric drivers for developing cyber strategy 
Frameworks Aspiring drivers 
CCDCOE Manual 
National security drives the creation of the National Cybersecurity 
Strategy, which should account for the following: 
• The 5 mandates 
• The 5 dilemmas 
Commonwealth 
Cybersecurity Guidelines 
Applying the Commonwealth principles  
EU Cybersecurity Strategy 
• Promoting EU values 
• Protecting fundamental rights 
• Access for all 
• Democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance 
• A shared responsibility to ensure security 
ITU-GCA 
Mandated from the High-Level Experts Group (HLEG) meeting, which is 
asking for a commitment by member countries to a Global Cybersecurity 
Agenda (GCA) to work on five key Work Areas:  
• Legal 
• Technical and procedural  
• Organisational structures  
• Capacity-building; and  
• International cooperation. 
OAS Cybersecurity Strategy 
Mandated by the following resolutions: 
• AG/RES. 2004 Cybersecurity Strategy (RESOLUTION) 
• AG/RES. 1939 (XXXIII-O/03) Development of an Inter-American 
Strategy to Combat Threats to Cybersecurity 
NIST Framework Business Strategy 
ISACA Framework Business Strategy 
 
Table 5. Shared concepts of cybersecurity frameworks 
 
Shared concepts Definition Doc Freq 
Building online trust To enhance the confidence of all stakeholders in using 
cyberspace 
15 228 
Digital redundancy To maintain resilience and capabilities or services that 
were impaired due to a cybersecurity event 
3 11 
Protecting critical assets of 
cyberspace 
To protect intangible and tangible critical cyber assets, 
such as privacy, data and infrastructure 
11 27 
Promoting privacy online To promote protection of identifiable information against 
unauthorized access and disclosure 
13 170 
Creating coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration 
To coordinate, cooperate and collaborate with cyber 
security stakeholders including external and internal 
organizational entities  
17 371 
External Outward actions 16 167 
Alliancing and partnering To cooperate with other entities with the same mutual 
benefit to combat cyber threats and respond to events 
and incidents 
12 62 
Diplomacy and soft 
power 
To use the ability to define international norms and 
standards relevant to international behaviour in 
cyberspace, representing a form of ‘soft power’ 
3 4 
Information sharing To cooperate by sharing information regarding threats 
and attacks to keep up-to-date with the latest threats 
and developments 
12 50 
Promoting inclusion To promote inclusion and share responsibility across all 
stakeholders in cybersecurity 
12 32 
Third-party uptake To ensure that third parties not directly subject to 
internal organizational policies adhere to cybersecurity 
8 23 
Internal Inward actions 16 202 
Communication To engage with all actors to communicate the strategy 6 17 
Coordination To coordinate across the internal system on cybersecurity 
mandates 
12 64 
Creating a governance To create set of frameworks and boundaries for security 
management including an organizational structure, a 
coordinator or leader, formal policies and guidelines for 
some aspects of cybersecurity 
12 54 
Roles and responsibility To minimize overlapping functions between each 
organization by creating clear roles and responsibilities 
13 66 
Profiling the cyber state To set the goals and budget 14 249 
Aligning strategy with core 
values 
To establish a coherent implementation of the current 
core values 
11 87 
Budgeting and setting up 
resources 
To define budgets and resources prior to implementation 12 46 
Setting up the assumption To assess what the organization needs and define its 
context 
12 109 
Promoting uptake To fill the gap between unsecure and secure conditions 
by increasing cyber capacity, capabilities and the 
resilience of internal stakeholders to achieve the same 
conditions  
16 270 
Shared concepts Definition Doc Freq 
Awareness To increase peoples’ capacities in and awareness of 
cyberspace, such as creating security guidance, helping 
stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities 
in cyberspace, and social engagement 
13 76 
Culture To promote a cybersecurity culture or a national mindset 
on cybersecurity 
4 14 
Research and innovation To foster research and innovation 10 24 
Innovative technology To update or advance technologies and techniques that 
are used as reliable tools to fight cybercrime 
8 31 
Responsiveness To identify threats early and increase capacity, 
preparedness and engagement when adapting to threats. 
This includes creating incident response teams 
8 48 
Human empowerment To enhance human resource capacities 13 62 
Reviewing To ensure that the cybersecurity programme is delivered 
on target 
12 173 
Audit and log To establish due care and analysis of the current 
implementation 
7 52 
Feedback To involve outside observers to report incidents of 
misconduct  
5 9 
Programme refinement To refine the programme and evaluate it to achieve 
strategy improvements, routinely investing effort to 
continuously improve  
9 52 
Self-assessment To identify the emerging trends and needs of evolving 
cyberspace by developing cyber matrices 
10 51 
Establishing a legal 
environment 
To develop a legal environment as a basis for drawing 
legal and illegal activities in cyberspace 
16 132 
Defining policies To create a legal rationale to conduct action in 
cyberspace 
13 55 
Developing strategy and 
framework 
To develop a strategy, mechanisms and a roadmap that 
function as tactical and direct governance to secure 
cyberspace 
9 20 
Law enforcement To enact cyber security law by taking corrective action in 
response to misconduct  
10 42 
Creating standards Having best practices and a standard of conduct 15 117 
Promoting interoperability To follow recognized standards, guidelines, conduct, 
norms and best practices which are open, global and 
accepted internationally, by relying on global standards, 
guidelines and practices developed, managed and 
updated by industry  
13 49 
Standardizing conduct To develop and establish minimum conduct 
requirements, such as creating a practical and effective 
implementation programme and technical guidelines 
8 42 
Sources/References 18 1544 
 




The NATO Defence Planning Process, which comprises 
• Step 1 - Establish political guidance 
• Step 2 - Determine requirements 
• Step 3 - Apportion requirements and set targets 
• Step 4 - Facilitate implementation 




Risk assessment and management 
• Risk assessment 
• Risk identification  
• Risk analysis  
• Risk evaluation 
• Risk management 
• Prevention  
• Detection  
• Response  
• Recovery 
EU Cybersecurity Strategy Developing-executing-evaluating-adjusting 










Table 7. Cybersecurity life cycle map 
 Profiling Delivering Assuring 
ITU-GCA Plan Do Check-Act 
CCDCOE Manual Step 1 - Establish political 
guidance 
Step 4 - Facilitate 
implementation 
Step 5 - 
Review results 
Step 2 - Determine 
requirements 
Step 3 - Apportion 
requirements and set targets 
EU Cybersecurity Strategy Developing Executing Evaluating 
Adjusting 
ISO27032 Plan Do Check-act 
Microsoft Cybersecurity 
Manual 
Risk identification Prevention Recovery 
Risk analysis Detection 
Risk evaluation Response 





Development Delivering Reviewing 
ISACA Cybersecurity Nexus Plan Implement Evaluate 
Design Operate Update 
 
 
Table 8. Summary of cybersecurity framework 
  Profiling Delivering Assuring 
Human Budgeting and setting up 
resources 
Awareness Feedback 
Setting the assumption Culture   
 Promoting privacy online   
  Training and education   
Organizational 
 
Aligning with core values Alliancing and partnering Programme refinement 
Budgeting and setting up 
resources 
Communication Self-assessment 
Creating governance Coordination   
Creating roles and 
responsibilities 
Diplomacy and soft power   
  Information sharing   
  Promoting inclusion   
  Responsiveness   
  Third-party uptake   
Infrastructure Setting the assumption Digital redundancy Audit and log 
Setting the resources Innovative technology   
  Protecting critical asset of 
cyberspace 
  
  Responsiveness   
  Standardising conduct   
Technology 
 
Setting the assumption Innovative technology Audit and log 
Setting the resources Promoting interoperability   
  Research and innovation   
  Responsiveness   
Law and 
regulatory 
Defining policies Legal investigation Legal investigation 
Developing strategy and 
framework 




Figure 1. Research protocol 
 
Step 1 - Defining  
scope
•Defining scope of 
research
Step 2 - Document 
selection
• Search strategy 
(keyword)
• Inclusion and exclusion 
criteria








Figure 1. Theme development process 
Digital redundancy [9], [10], [11]
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Forming alliances and partnerships [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [11], [12]
Diplomacy and soft power [2], [5], [7]
Information sharing [1], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]
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Training and education [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Audit and log [1], [4], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Feedback [1], [7], [9], [11]
Program refinement [1], [3], [5], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Self-assessment [2], [4], [5], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Defining policies [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Developing strategy and framework [2], [4], [5], [7], [9], [12]
Legal investigation [2], [3], [4], [5], [7], [9], [11], [12]
Promoting interoperability [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]
Standardising conduct [1], [2], [4], [7], [9], [10], [11]
Law and Regulation
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Figure 1. The five pillars of cybersecurity 
 
 
Figure 4. Three processes of cybersecurity  
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